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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of Issues
1.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, Volvo

was not able to trace $693,132 in funds in which it claimed a security interest because an
exception to the neutral lowest intermediale balance tracing rules would not be created
and applied in this case for the $900,000 transferred to Wells Fargo where Wells Fargo
was an innocent third party transferee?1
2.

Does Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 92 of Utah's Uniform

Commercial Code apply to the transactions at issue, thereby barring Volvo's claims
against Wells Fargo?
3.

If Revised Article 9 does not apply, are Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo

barred under the "ordinary course" defense set forth in Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official
Comment 2(c) thereto of pre-Revised Article 9 of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code?

1

If this Court agrees with the district court s legal ruling, there is no need for further
analysis. Otherwise, issues 2 and 3 will need to be decided in this appeal.
~ Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC was enacted by the Utah Legislature in 2000. As part
of the revisions to Article 9, transition rules were enacted which set the effective date for
the revisions as July 1, 2001, see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-701, but also provided that
''except as otherwise provided m this part, this act applies to a transaction or lien within
its scope, even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this act takes
effect." See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-702(l).
1

Standard of Review: Because the district court decided the issue on summary
judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, 922 P.2d
8 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
I.

Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (pre-Revised Article 9) provided:

(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor.
Official Comment 2(c) to pre-Revised § 70A-9-306(2) provides:
(c) Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking
account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may
have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and
transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no
doubt in appropriate cases support recovery of proceeds by a secured party
from a transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the
debtor to defraud the secured party.
II.

Former Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3) (pre-Revised Article 9) provided:

(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected
security interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it
ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days
after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless:

(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral
and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
III.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332 provides:

(2) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free
of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
IV.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-702(l) provides:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was
entered into or created before this act takes effect.
V.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l) provides:

(1) This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to
collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established
before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Volvo Commercial Finance LLC The Americas ("Volvo") seeks damages of
$693,000 from Wells Fargo Bank ("Wells Fargo") relating to monies transferred by
Volvo's debtor, Great Basin, to Wells Fargo to cover checks Great Basin had written on
its Wells Fargo accounts to pay business expenses. Wells Fargo received no notice of
any kind from Volvo, and had no knowledge that the transfer violated Volvo's security
interest. Rather, Great Basin simply made the transfer to cover its checks as it had
promised Wells Fargo. Under these circumstances involving two innocent parties,
Volvo's claims were properly dismissed under the governing tracing rules. Alternatively,
Volvo's claims are barred under applicable Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") statutes.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Volvo financed the purchase of Volvo
vehicles by some of the Great Basin tmck dealerships and took a security interest in those
trucks. In the fall of 2000, the Great Basin tmck dealerships began to experience
3

financial difficulties and got behind in sending truck sales proceeds to Volvo. In late
December 2000, some potential overdrafts appeared in a Great Basin concentration
account at Wells Fargo. In response to a call from Wells Fargo, Great Basin promised,
and then wire-transferred $900,000 into the concentration account on December 29,
2000, to cover the potential $830,000 in overdrafts. Those potential overdrafts related to
checks that had been written in the regular course of Great Basin's business, including
nearly $500,000 in checks to Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. ("Volvo Trucks").
Volvo now seeks damages of $693,000 from Wells Fargo for the monies transferred by
Great Basin to cover the checks based on an asserted exception or alteration to the
universally accepted and neutral lowest intermediate balance rules of tracing ("LIBR").
However, on the undisputed facts there is no legal or factual basis for such a departure
from LIBR. And, in any event, under applicable UCC provisions Wells Fargo received
the transferred funds free of Volvo's security interest.
Course of Proceedings
On June 13, 2002, Volvo filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo alleging that
$693,000 of $900,000 that was transferred by Great Basin into a concentration account
on December 29, 2000, to cover its business checks, constituted traceable proceeds from
the sale of 53 vehicles in which Volvo claimed a security interest. Wells Fargo filed an
amended answer denying liability and asserting several affirmative defenses."3

J

Because die district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, Wells
Fargo's affirmative defenses have never been addressed.
4

Volvo moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of Wells Fargo's
liability on the conversion claim but not on damages. R. 761-63. Wells Fargo filed a
motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all claims. R. 813-15. On
November 11, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision denying Volvo's
motion and granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, R. 2210-15, and
entered Judgment dismissing all claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. R. 2216-25.
On December 7, 2005, Volvo filed its notice of appeal. R. 2226-28.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Organization and Financing of the Great Basin Entities,
Great Basin Company, Inc. was the parent company of several dealership and
service subsidiaries engaged in the business of selling and servicing GMC, Volvo, Mack,
Great Dane, East and Dyna-Weld trucks and trailers (the entities shall collectively be
referred to as "Great Basin" or the "Great Basin Entities"). R. 1278. The Great Basin
dealerships in Salt Lake, Arizona, Albuquerque, and Idaho obtained floor plan financing
from Volvo, secured by all new and used trucks, motor vehicles, tractors, trailers and
similar equipment of the foregoing entities (the uVolvo Floor Plan Agreements").
R. 857, 861, 946, 948-71.

Other Great Basin dealerships obtained floor plan financing

from Associates Commercial Corporation ("Associates") secured by all new and used
trucks and trailers. R. 1143, 1147-58. Most of the Great Basin Entities were also
obligated on an operating line of credit with Zions First National Bank, N.A. ("Zions
Bank") secured by a borrowing base comprised of various assets of the obligors on the
line of credit. R. 1078-79, 1143, 1160-64.

<N

C r e a t Basin's Cash Management System,

•.;^ ^ m e n t system at Wells Fargo in 1998 through treasury management accounts (the
"Treasury Management Accounts") for each of the separate Great Basin Entities, and a
,1

concentration account irjemiir^i .L, ac, v

*N ^ > ^ "

"

'

••': * 1

\ \ n mill 'in r "l( ' I "i 11 I'I I MC tit day the operating funds generated by the Great Basin
Entities were deposited into each individual entity's Treasury Management Account, and
then funds in the Treasury Management Accounts were swept into the Concenti atic ai
, UXullIlli
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As part of the cash management system, a Controlled Disbursement Account was
also set up out of which paym.en.ts to third parties could, and generally were made by the
Great Basin ktiiifies " I «'" 'lit" t Merit lie <" iival Basin Pndfifr, ninVH l<» mal-r i paytncit
•isiness operations or taxes, they did so from either the Controlled Disbursement
Account or the individual Treasury Management Accounts and sufficient funds were
transferred into those accounts lrom the ( oiiecnliaiimi it< utmi su (li.il ilk pa\ nicnts
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Gi eat Basin's Financial Difficulties and Notices of its Default.
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2ui.
4

•;

,*j i.-i.:.

.

,,•,, ,.< -

-

:,

. ..

v,n »«/lenders, including Volvo. R. 1039-

The checks for the Controlled Disbursement Account contaiiI a specific reference on the
top of the check stating to "Wachovia Bank, N.A. Greensville, South Carolina In
Cooperation with & Payable if Desire at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." 'Therefore. Volvo
cannot claim it was not aware of Great Basin's banking relationship with Wells Famo.
R. 2126-40.

40. In early September 2000, Volvo concluded that payments of the floor plan amounts
owed to Volvo were being delayed by Great Basin contrary to the terms of the Volvo
Floor Plan Agreements. R. 1039-40. Over the next few months, Volvo conducted
several audits of the pertinent Great Basin Entities, which, according to Volvo, "revealed
that the Dealerships . . . intentionally and deliberately [withheld] payment from Volvo on
sold vehicles." R. 1031-34, 1045-51, 1062-64.
On December 8, 2000, Volvo sent out a notice of default to the pertinent Great
Basin Entities stating that they must pay ail the sums due and owing to Volvo in full by
December 18, 2000. R. 1034-35, 1051-52. On December 20, 2000, Volvo notified the
pertinent Great Basin Entities in writing that because the event of default was not cured,
Volvo was suspending the lines of credit under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements.
R. 1036, 1053-55. On December 21 and 22, 2000, Volvo sent written notices to account
debtors of the Great Basin Entities who had purchased Volvo vehicles directing them to
pay all funds owed to the Great Basin Entities directly to Volvo. R. 1036, 1056-58. In
addition, on December 22, 2000, Volvo sent a written notice to Zions Bank directing it
"to segregate any proceeds of the sale of our inventory that come into any dealerships'
account(s) at Zions, to hold the funds as constructive trustee for the benefit of Volvo
Finance, and to forward the proceeds directly to [Volvo]

" R. 1080-81, 1084-85.

However, no such notice was sent to Wells Fargo. Indeed, at no time did Volvo
even notify Wells Fargo that Great Basin was in default under the Volvo Floor Plan
Agreements, or make a demand on Wells Fargo that it turn over to or hold for Volvo's

7
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In its factual statement, Volvo references its settlement A uh / i o n s Bank and suggests
Wells Fargo should have followed suit (Applt's Brief at 10), but Volvo fails to note the
crucial distinction that it gave notice to Zions Bank that it claimed a secuntv interest m
proceeds from Great Basin's sale of Volvo trucks. It is undisputed that Volvo gave no
such notice to Wells Fargo.

Great Basin then, as promised, caused $300,000 to be wire transferred from the First
Security Account into the Concentration Account on December 27, 2000. R. 1000, 1012.
On the morning of December 28, 2000, Wells Fargo representatives received the
Daily Overdraft Management Report indicating that if all the checks from the Controlled
Disbursement Account or the Treasury Management Accounts presented for payment
against the Concentration Account on December 27, 2000, were processed and honored,
then the Concentration Account would be overdrawn in the amount of $790,160.73. R.
1000-01, 1104, 1113-14. That same morning Wells Fargo again contacted Mary Sheets
at Great Basin to inform her of the status of the Concentration Account, and she
responded that Great Basin would cover the overdraft by making a wire transfer of funds
into the Concentration Account. R. 1104. Based on Great Basin's oral promise, Wells
Fargo permitted the checks that would cause the $790,160.73 overdraft to be processed in
the normal course. R. 1104-05. As discussed below, Great Basin made that wire
transfer into the Concentration Account on the following day, December 29, 2000.
On the morning of December 29, 2000, representatives of Wells Fargo received
the Daily Overdraft Management Report which indicated that another approximately
$39,000 in checks from the Controlled Disbursement Account or the Treasury
Management Accounts had been presented against the Concentration Account on
December 28, 2000, and if those checks were processed and honored, then the
Concentration Account would be overdrawn in the total amount of $828,951.36. R.
1001-02, 1105, 1116-18. Significantly, the potential $828,951.36 overdraft was caused

0

in substantial part by multiple checks totaling b4V»; V)

pa\ aoK
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compan) ', V ob - • : •• I "i i lcks R 1 218 19
On December 29, 2000, Wells Fargo's representative again contacted Mary Sheets
that morning to inform her of the statiis of the Concentration Account. Sheets responded
,<ir r
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i* no the Concentration Account to cover the overdraft of December 28 th plus the

additional $39,000, R. 1105-06, 1116-18. Based on Great Basin's oral promise, Wells
Fargo permitted the approximately >.r*
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$328,051 36 to be processed in the normal course. R. 1001-02, 1106. As promised, on.
December 29, 2000, Great Basin caused $900,000 to be wire transferred from, an account
at First Security Bank (the "TnM >eeuiiiv
ccn ' :: i the checks
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Entities were experiencing financial difficulties at the time Great Basin made the wire
transfers into the Concentration Account on December 2 ( \ 200*
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Great Basin's Bankruptcy Filing and. ""Volvo s ('oni(i II, i i i mi iIII
On January 5, 2001, some of the Great Basin Entities filed for bankruptcy in Utah.
R.

;43, 1187, \ in June 13, 2002, Volvo filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo asserting

causes ci acuoi. ;or conversion, I n yi ist erii ichii lei it. and ::oi isti t ictiv e ti i ist prei i lised c i I the
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• • HJ ,000 that was transferred by Great Basin into a
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Volvo does not contend that the disbursements made on December 28 th and 29 th were
other than for the puipose of paying Great Basin's regular business expenses presumably
because more than half of the disbursements that contributed to the total overdraft on
December 29, 2000 were made to Volvo Tn lcks.
10

Concentration Account on December 29, 2000, constituted traceable proceeds from the
sale of the 53 vehicles in which Volvo claimed a security interest. R. 1-15.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Because Volvo's claims depend on being able to trace truck sales proceeds to the
$900,000 wire transfer made by Great Basin on December 29, 2000, the analysis in this
case begins with the determination of the applicable tracing rules. The law in Utah and
elsewhere follows the lowest intermediate balance rule ("LIBR") as the proper tracing
method. There is no dispute that if the LIBR rules are followed in this case, no traceable
truck sales proceeds in which Volvo held a security interest were in the Concentration
Account on the critical date of December 29, 2000, and Volvo's claims fail.
The first rule of tracing under LIBFL's is that where there are commingled funds in
an account, it is presumed that non-trust funds are removed before trust funds. Because
the Concentration Account had a negative balance on December 27, 2000, under LIBR
all the proceeds from the sale of Volvo's collateral had been dissipated from the
Concentration Account by that date and thus, there were no truck sales proceeds Volvo
could trace. In addition, the second rule of tracing under LIBR holds that new deposits
generally do not replenish trust funds. Under that rule, the $900,000 wire transfer made
from the First Security Account into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000,

7

The tracing analysis prepared by Derk Rasmussen (a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum Ex. A), Wells Fargo's accounting expert, which applies the LIBR rules
strictly and neutrally to all the transfers in the Concentration Account in December, 2000,
shows that no proceeds from the sale of Volvo trucks could have been included in the
$900,000 wire transfer on December 29, 2000.
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situ rn^r -cK.ts in this case. Additionally, the exception advocated by Volvo is
inapplicable in any event because the $900,000 transfer on December 29, 2000, was
made by Great Basin to cover check
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be particularly unfair in this case where Volvo seeks to recover funds from Wells Fargo
that were paid to Volvo Trucks.

1?

Because the district court followed LIBR's rules in granting summary judgment, it
did not need to reach Wells Fargo's additional arguments. However, if Volvo could trace
its proceeds into the $900,000 transfer, either Revised Article 9, adopted in 2000, or preRevised Article 9 precludes Volvo's claim. Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9
states that "a transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds "free" of a
security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party." There is no allegation by Volvo that
Wells Fargo colluded with Great Basin to harm Volvo or deprive it of its collateral in this
case. As such, Wells Fargo, as an innocent transferee, took the $900,000 in wired funds
free of any security interest Volvo had in those funds.
Even if, as Volvo contends, pre-Revised Article 9 applies in this case, Section
70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto also provide Wells Fargo an absolute
defense to Volvo's claims because that section protects transferees who receive money in
the ordinary course. Wells Fargo was clearly an ordinary course recipient of the funds
that were transferred by Great Basin. Wells Fargo and Great Basin had a long standing
banking relationship and Great Basin was merely taking the necessary and customary
action to pay its regular business expenses as evidenced by the fact that the overdrafts
included the $494,493.77 in checks payable to Volvo Trucks.
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Lowest Intermediate Balance Tracing Rule.
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r-i*v- iulc\1 bank account, then that party must be able to trace its funds. See
Sisman v. Ogden State Bank (In re Ogden State Bank), 94 Utah 61, 75 P.2d 3 T*. ? 1 7
(Utah 1938). In Sisman, tlii i ;.ui i-^pu me V oun -^nc
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. » • j that the burden of tracing rests on the claimant:

"It is indispensable to the maintenance by the cestui que trust.,. "that clear
proof be made that the trust property or its proceeds went into a specific
d or into a specific identical piece of property which came into the hands
"• the receiver, and then the claim can be sustained to that fimd or property
•M
' • v, and only to the extent that the trust property or its proceeds went into
It is not sufficient to prove that the trust property or its proceeds went
iiiio the general assets of the insolvent estate and increased the amount and
value thereof which came into the hands of the receiver. The burden of
tracing the trust fund into the assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver,
or of identifying it in his hands, rests upon the cestui que trust or claimant/'
hi

>>«!.i;j iii

M ,.i.juivuitiwiiv)i i'.iiaiiciai insiiiuiiuns <J N5U) (emphasis added).'

Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in Kent v. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 P. 271 (I Jtah
1917), also stated that the Must claimant's rights fail if it cannot trace its trust funds:
When trust money becomes so mixed up with the trustee's individual funds
that it is impossible to trace and identify it as entering into some specific
property, the trust ceases. The court will go as far as it can in thus tracing
and following trust money; but when, as a matter of fact, it cannot be
traced, the equitable right of the cestui que Must \o toilou :i U\w>.
Id. at 272 (quotingLittle v. Chadwick, o l Mass. 109. 23N.E. ]<H)5 ( 1S(>(T».
1A

Although pre-Revised Article 9 is silent on the appropriate way to "identify" cash
proceeds that have been commingled with other funds in the debtor's general bank
account, the courts have permitted a secured party to assert a perfected security interest in
any cash proceeds remaining in a general bank account under the LIBR method of
tracing. See Tooele County Board of Education v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 478, 11 P.2d 320,
324-25 (Utah 1932) (explains how the "lowest intermediate balance" rule applies in these
situations and follows a "group of cases [that] holds that trust money must be traced into
a specific fund in the receiver's hands . . .").
The Utah bankruptcy court in In re JD Services, Inc., 284 B.R. 292, 298 (Bankr.
Utah 2002), explained the LIBR rules as follows:
Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, any funds removed from
a commingled account are presumed to be the Debtor's funds to the extent
the funds exceed the beneficiary's equitable interest. If the Trustee deposits
other funds into the commingled account, it is generally held that the
Trustee is not replenishing trust funds. New deposits are not subject to the
equitable claim of the trust beneficiary and subsequent withdrawals are
presumed to draw first upon the new funds. Applying the rule, a
constructive trust beneficiary may retrieve the lowest balance recorded after
the funds were commingled. [Citation omitted].
The United States Supreme Court in Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1914),
also made it clear that when a commingled fluid is dissipated, the trust fund is also
dissipated. See also Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1987)
(the lowest intermediate balance rule is applied to tracing, and if the fund is dissipated,
subsequent deposits into a commingled bank account do not replenish the trust funds.)
The accepted application of LIBR thus involves two rules. First, when
withdrawals are made from a commingled general bank account, such withdrawals are
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does not '-rp'y to all transfers but only to transfers that are "dissipated." Applt's Brief .u
26. Tn other words, Volvo argues for an exception to LIP>R. that when "a trustee or a, "tor
does not dissipate funds w ithdr a vv n from a :: :»i i imingled accoi int. 1: ii I 1: n istead maintaii is
possession of the funds or their product (in cash, in another account, or other assets), the
withdrawal does not defeat the beneficiary's or creditor's interest." Id. at 26-27.
Howrever, this theory im:* a:-, a inatiei i-i ,>o\ hccai; i a- u. •.-. • \ \\ h a*
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.:• \ because as a matter of fact, all the funds were

dissipated.
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B.

Volvo's Proposed Exception to LIBR' First Rule Should be Rejected.

Volvo's accounting expert, David Judd, prepared a tracing analysis of the
proceeds from Great Basin's December 2000 sale of Volvo vehicles in which Volvo
asserts a security interest. Mr. Judd concluded that $693,132 of the $900,000 that was
wire transferred into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000 can be traced to
the sale of 53 Volvo vehicles in which Volvo held a security interest. In doing so,
Mr. Judd acknowledged that LIBR is the proper method of tracing and, indeed, defined it
correctly as follows: "funds are traced or identified based on the assumption that the
entity/debtor spends its own money from the accounts before it spends the security
interest proceeds or trust funds. If the account balance falls below the amount of such
proceeds, the security interest in the funds held in the account reduces accordingly." R.
1255-56. However, Mr. Judd then departed from the proper application of LIBR in three
separate instances, departures which Mr. Judd acknowledged but justified on his
proffered distinction for treating transfers between Great Basin's accounts not as transfers
for LIBR purposes, a distinction he admitted was unsupported by any authority. First,
Mr. Judd assumed that the $1,500,000 which was withdrawn from the Concentration
Account on December 21, 2000 consisted entirely of trust funds (or Volvo truck sales
9

Mr. Judd was asked whether he had relied on any authority to support his departure
from LIBR and he responded as follows:
Q.
Do you have any authority for the tracing treatment that is reflected in your
treatment of the $1.5 million?
A.
Making reference to legal authority?
Q.
Any authority - accounting authority, tracing authority, legal authority.
A.
No.
R. 1136.
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proceeds) even though non-trust funds were available in the Concentration Account in the
amount of $1,297,489. See AppIt's Add. Ex. 2. Under LIBR's tracing rules, non-trust
funds are treated as having been withdrawn from the Concentration Account before the
trust fiinds. Thus, Mr. Judd departed from LIBR rules in his treatment of the $1,500,000
withdrawal on December 21, 2000.
Second, Mr. Judd assumed that $291,919 of the $500,000 that was withdrawn
from the Concentration Account on December 22, 2000, consisted of "trust funds" (or
Volvo truck sales proceeds) even though non-trust funds were available in the
Concentration Account in the amount of $933,415. R. 1131. Under LIBR, those nontrust funds should have been treated as withdrawn from the Concentration Account
before the trust funds. Thus, in his treatment of the December 22, 2000 withdrawal,
Mr. Judd again departed from LIBR's first rule.
Third, Mr. Judd assumed that the $900,000 that was wire transferred on December
29, 2000, by Great Basin from the First Security Account to the Concentration Account
consisted of $693,132 of "trust funds" (or Volvo truck sales proceeds) even though under
LIBR's second rule, subsequent deposits into the Concentration Account are presumed
not to replenish trust funds. R. 1131. Once again, Mr. Judd departed from LIBR's
neutral rules in order to make Volvo's claims work in this case.
In order to justify Judd's departures, Volvo argues for an exception to LIBR and
principally relies on three century-old cases in support thereof. However, Volvo's
argument for altering the two well accepted and longstanding rules of LIBR in cases in
which funds "are transferred but not dissipated" should be rejected for a number of
1 O

reasons. First, the modern UCC cases apply LIBR without recognizing the departure
suggested by Volvo. Second, even the old cases cited by Volvo do not stand for the legal
proposition asserted by Volvo. All of these cases pre-dated the adoption of the UCC and
as such their continuing validity is questionable. Moreover, these cases either involve
wrongdoing by the trustee/debtor (e.g., Brennan, In re Oatway), or a circumstance in ,
which funds remained in the hands of the trustee-debtor (Lincoln). Clearly, neither of
those circumstances exists here. Put simply, Volvo points to no case where its proposed
exception to the LIBR rules is applied against an innocent transferee, such as Wells
Fargo, and especially where the funds were dissipated at the debtor's own direction.
Third, the undisputed facts of this case, including the fact that Wells Fargo is an innocent
transferee, do not support a departure from LIBR, and in fact, show that LIBR should be
applied strictly. Finally, the application of Volvo's proposed exception would not aid
Volvo's cause because the funds in question have in fact been dissipated and nondissipation is the essential element of the exception.
1.

The Modern Cases Apply LIBR Without the Departure from the
First Rule of LIBR that Volvo Suggests.,

The modern cases have adopted LIBR as the appropriate tracing method in
determining whether trust funds that have been commingled with other funds are
identifiable. In re JD Services, 284 B.R. at 297. In the modem commercial context, the
cases apply LIBR's two rules strictly and neutrally, and without the exception Volvo
advocates. See, ejj., Meyer v. Norwest Bank Iowa, Nat. Ass'n, 112 F.3d 946, 951 (8th
Cir. 1997) (The court employed a strict LIBR analysis in that case and found that the
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creditor could only trace a limited amount of funds.); Bank of Kansas v. Hutchison
Health Services, Inc., 735 P.2d 256 (Kan. App. 1987) (The court employed a strict
application of LIBR in determining that some of the proceeds from the debtor's
disposition of collateral were "identifiable" and the security interest continued in those
proceeds.); Foster v. Hill 275 F.3d 924, 927 n.l (10th Cir. 2001) (the Tenth Circuit
provided an example of the application of LIBR in which it applied its two rules strictly.);
In re Edison Brothers, Inc., 268 B.R. 409, 413-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (The application
of LIBR defeated a party's claim to trust funds because the debtor's cash management
account had been completely dissipated.).
The reason the modern courts strictly apply LIBR is because the fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, or conscious wrongdoing that are often at the heart of the old common law
cases cited by Volvo typically do not exist in a commercial setting. Rather, the cases
most often deal with two innocent parties, as here. While the UCC recognizes that a
secured party, by virtue of its security agreement, typically has greater rights in
identifiable collateral than an unsecured creditor, when a secured party's collateral
proceeds become commingled with other funds, the secured party's position becomes
more akin to that of an unsecured creditor. The reason for that outcome is that a secured
creditor, such as Volvo, could have protected itself by requiring the debtor to segregate
its collateral proceeds (as Volvo did with Zions), but having failed to do so, the secured
party cannot then complain that it may lose its security interest as to certain funds that are
transferred to an innocent party. In short, modern courts will allow a secured party to
trace its proceeds to the extent possible under a strict application of LIBR, but will go no
on

further absent exceptional circumstances because there is no difference or disparity in the
equitable status between the secured creditor and the unsecured creditor.10
2.

Volvo's Cases Do Not Support A Departure from LIBR.

Volvo relies primarily on three non-Utah cases from the early 1900's as alleged
support for the proposition that the first mle of LIBR must be departed from when tracing
funds that have been "transferred but not dissipated," which Volvo describes as the
Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule.11 Applt's Brief at 28-32. However, those cases do not
stand for the proposition asserted by Volvo. Rather, the cases ultimately turned on a
finding of either conscious wrongdoing on the part of the holder of the funds or that the
funds remained in the hands of the debtor-trustee, neither of which conditions exist in this
case. Moreover, those cases were decided before the adoption of the UCC for the
modem commercial world.

10

Another problem with Volvo's proposed exception is its potential complicated
application in a modern commercial context because it is not clear when funds are
"transferred but not dissipated." Such a proposed exception apparently introduces an
"intent" element, i.e. at what point does the transfer change from a "regular" transfer to a
transfer intended for dissipation? For instance, what if the funds are transferred from one
account into another account and then sit there for an hour, or five hours, or one day, or
one week? It would be difficult to make that determination for a single transfer let alone
hundreds of transfers that may occur in a commercial context. And, in the case at bar,
how would the district court determine that Great Basin's transfers of the $1.5 million
and $500,000 in December of 2000 were not intended for dissipation?
11
Volvo also cites Waddell v. Waddell, 36 Utah 435, 104 P. 743 (1909), for the
proposition that where trust funds are converted into another form of property (even if
those trust funds have been commingled with other funds) that the trust will extend to
that new property. Applt's Brief at 27. This is an overstatement. The court in Waddell
made it clear that a trust can be imposed on new property only to the extent that the
original trust proceeds are traceable into that property. Id. at 749. Because Volvo cannot
trace any of its collateral proceeds into the $900,000 wire transfer on December 29, 2000,
it has no claim against Wells Fargo.
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a.

Brennan v. Tillinghast

The first case that Volvo relies on is Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 F. 609 (6th Cir.
1913). In that case, John Brennan borrowed $1,000 from Ironwood Bank ("Ironwood")
secured in part by 200 shares of the capital stock of Shattuck-Arizona Copper Company.
Subsequently, Ironwood wrongfully sold 195 of the shares of the stock and deposited the
$3,558.75 in proceeds into a pre-existing account that Ironwood had with Duluth Bank.
Against this open account, Ironwood subsequently drew four drafts in favor of the
American Express Company for which Ironwood was paid $2,807.32 in cash by
American Express. At all times until the Ironwood was closed and a receiver was
appointed, it continually had in cash in its own vaults the sum of at least $3,500.
Eventually, more than $15,000 in cash came into the hands of the receiver of Ironwood.
Brennan filed an action against the receiver asserting a preferred claim as to the value of
the stock he had pledged as collateral. The appeals court upheld the decision in favor of
Brennan based on the analysis that the four cash drafts drawn in favor of American
Express, constituted in effect, a transfer of $2,807.32 of the stock proceeds to cash which
remained in the vaults of Ironwood Bank until it came into the possession of the receiver.
Id. at 613. The court rejected the receiver's tracing argument similar to LIBR's first rule,
holding that Brennan should prevail over the conscious wrongdoer, Ironwood, i.e., "[i]n
such a case, it must be held that the trust attached to the substituted form in which the
property is retained by the tort-feasor...". Id. at 614. In other words, the court refused to
apply the neutral rules of LIBR to the benefit of the wrongdoer.

??

b.

In re Oatway

The second case cited by Volvo is In In re Oatway, 2 Ch. Div. 356 (1903). In that
case, Maxwell Skipper and L.J. Oatway were the co-trustees of the estate of Charles
Skipper. Three thousand pounds was advanced in breach of trust out of Charles
Skipper's estate to Maxwell Skipper, which advance was secured by a mortgage of an
undivided share of certain real estate to which Maxwell Skipper was entitled under his
grandfather's will. Oatway subsequently sold Skipper's undivided interest in the real
estate for the sum of 7000 pounds and placed that money into his own bank account.
Oatway never paid back the 3000 pounds to the estate of Charles Skipper. Subsequently,
Oatway purchased 1000 shares of Oceana stock for 2137 pounds which he paid for by
check from his bank account. At the time the Oceana stock was purchased, Oatway's
checking account contained a balance of 6,635 pounds which included the 3000 pounds
that belonged to the estate of Charles Skipper. Subsequently, Oatway's bank account
was exhausted. Oatway died and the issue decided by the court was whether the estate of
Charles Skipper or the estate of L. J. Oatway should receive the Oceana stock. The
English Court of Chancery rejected the argument that because Oatway's own funds in the
checking account were in excess of the 2137 pounds that were paid for the stock, he was
entitled to withdraw that sum and apply it for his own purposes, and the Oceana shares
should belong to his estate. The court held that because Oatway was a fiduciary, "he
cannot maintain that the investment which remains represents his own money alone and
that what has been spent and can no longer be traced and recovered was the money
belonging to the trust." Id. at 360. The court also held that Oatway "never was entitled
23

to withdraw the 2137/. from the account, or . . . hold it. . . freed from the charge in favor
of the trust." Id. at 361. Thus, the holding in Oatway is based on the fact that Oatway
had acted wrongfully and that as a fiduciary he should not be able to use the tracing rules
to the detriment of the beneficiary.
c.

City of Lincoln v. Morrison

Volvo also cites to City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 90 N.W. 905 (Neb. 1902). In that
case, the City of Lincoln, in contravention of the law, had placed $5,000 of the City's
money into Lincoln Savings Bank, taking a certificate of deposit in return. After the
deposit was made, the Bank had $41,699.96 in cash on hand. Subsequently, the Bank
purchased state warrants for $36,750 using as partial payment $1,750 of the cash on hand
at the Bank. Thereafter, the Bank suspended operations and a receiver was appointed.
The receiver received, inter alia, $3,334.37 from the sale of the state warrants. The City
then asserted a preferred claim for the $5,000.
The court ultimately ruled in favor of the City, finding that it had a preferred claim
to the remaining funds from the sale of the warrants, or the $3,334.37. Id. at 909. In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that when trust monies are commingled with non1?

trust monies remaining in the hands of the trustee, then the cestui que trust is entitled to
a charge upon the whole so long as any portion of the mass into which the trust monies
The Lincoln court described this factor as requiring the beneficiary to "show that the
estate out of which he claims such preference has been increased to some extent by the
misappropriation of the trust property." Id. at 908. However, the court also rejected the
Bank's argument that the "fact of use of the money in the trustee's general business or in
paying his debts is, in effect, an increase of the assets..." Id. Thus, Lincoln provides no
guidance in a case like this where the funds in question were transferred to Wells Fargo
to be used to cover business expenses.

were placed remained in any form, and may be claimed. (Emphasis added). Id. at 908.
Because the court found that the City had a charge (or lien) on the whole of the funds out
of which the warrants were purchased, it followed that it also had a charge (or lien) on the
warrants. Id. at 909. Indeed, the court did not attempt to do a LIBR tracing analysis to
determine whether the City's money was used to purchase the warrants. Rather, the court
simply concluded that as to as to the bank (the debtor/trustee) it did not matter that "no
one can say what part of the cash on hand in the bank went into the warrants" because
where the bank still held the asset it could not avoid its duty to the trust beneficiary.
Lincoln is inapposite for several reasons. First, its general holding has been
rejected in modern cases which hold that merely tracing funds into a general account or
showing that assets were increased is not sufficient to establish that the funds have been
traced. See, e ^ , In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (the
beneficiaries of a trust must be able to trace their funds to identifiable trust assets and not
merely to the general funds of the debtor). Second, Lincoln's rationale was that the
debtor-trustee (which in this case would have been Great Basin) remained obligated if
any part or form of the trust funds remained in its hands.

For that reason, the Lincoln

holding, even if good law, would have no application as against an innocent third party
like Wells Fargo because the funds at issue no longer exist.
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Thus, Lincoln also held that "if the whole of the cash . . . was used in paying off other
depositors or in running expenses, the city is not entitled to a preference over general
creditors. . . ." Id. at 908.
25

Accordingly, the courts in Brennan, Oatway and Lincoln reached the conclusions
they did because of conscious wrongdoing by the person against whom the trust was
impressed or because the funds remained in the hands of the trustee. They did not adopt
the exception for funds "transferred but not dissipated" as claimed by Volvo here.15

In footnote 11 of its appellate brief, Volvo cites six other cases as alleged support for
the proposition that the first rule of LIBR does not apply when funds are transferred but
not dissipated. However, these cases are distinguishable and do not support Volvo's
argument. In In re Pacat Finance Corp., 27 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1928), Beradini
contended that the trustee in bankruptcy of Pacat Finance Corporation came into
possession of 750,000 lire which belonged to Beradini and Beradini sought to establish
his right to that money under, inter alia, a constructive trust theory. Beradini contended
that he could trace his own dollars into lire credits held by Credito Italiano and then back
into dollars held by the trustee. The court conceded that none of Beradini's dollars could
literally be traced into any of the lire credits, but nevertheless still imposed a trust in
favor of Beradini on monies held by the trustee. Id. at 813. Thus, Pacat has no
application here because it is at odds with modem case law which only permits tracing to
"identifiable proceeds." In Mitchell v. Dunn, 294 P. 386 (Cal. 1930), a guardian took
funds from an incompetent and commingled them with her own funds. In deciding who
was entitled to property purchased with the funds, the court ruled in favor of the
incompetent because the guardian had been dishonest. Republic Supply Co. of California
v. Richfield Oil Co., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935), involved a situation in which Richfield,
with knowledge that Universal had cash of $1,625,000 in its bank account, deliberately
purchased sufficient stock in Universal to procure control of Universal. Richfield then
misappropriated the cash and commingled it with Richfield's general funds in its
checking account. Given the facts, the court found that general tracing principles should
not be used to favor Richfield. In re Erie Trust Co., 191 A. 613 (Pa. 1937), also involved
wrongdoing. In that case, the estate of W.W. Gingrich filed an action against the Erie
Trust Company because it took cash from the estate as commissions to which it was not
entitled. Likewise, in Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hans, 545 N.E.2d 1063 (111. App. Ct.
1989), the Hanses had participated in a scheme in which they would dispose of certain
assets and execute certain notes in favor of Lindstrom to keep their farm operational. The
court also found that LIBR did not even apply in that case. Finally, In re Goldberg, 168
B.R. 382, 385 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), contains language that actually supports Wells
Fargo's position. The court stated that "[gjenerally, it is true that where a constructive
trust is sought to be imposed against the property of an insolvent debtor, strict tracing is
required. The purpose of this rule is to treat creditors equally." (Emphasis added).
15
Volvo also cites Restatement of Restitution §§211 and 212, Restatement of Trusts §
202, and Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 928, Rev. 2d ed. (1982), as further
O/C

3.

The Undisputed Facts in this Case Do Not Support a Departure
From the Universally Accepted Application of LIBR.

On the undisputed facts of this case the two well accepted rules of LIBR should be
followed for several reasons. First, there is no alleged wrongdoing on the part of Wells
Fargo, which was an innocent transferee in the ordinary course of business. Wells Fargo

support for its argument that the first rule of LIBR should not be followed in this case.
Volvo is wrong. These sections do not state that funds that "are transferred but
dissipated" must be treated differently from other transfers, as suggested by Volvo.
Rather, Restatement of Restitution § Section 211 indicates that where a person
wrongfully commingles personal and trust funds into a single account, the claimant may
be entitled to assert an equitable lien upon whatever remains of the whole of the deposit.
See comment a. to Section 211. Furthermore, the modem courts hold that the beneficiary
of a trust must be able to trace its funds to identifiable trust assets and not merely to
general funds in the hands of the debtor. See In re Winkle 128 B.R. 529, 535 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio. 1991). Restatement of Restitution § 212 appears to follow a strict application
of LIBR and states that where a person wrongfully commingles personal and trusts funds,
makes withdrawals that are dissipated and then subsequently adds money of his own to
the fund, the claimant ordinarily cannot enforce an equitable lien upon the account for a
sum greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. Restatement of Trusts §
202 simply provides that a beneficiary of a trust is entitled, at its option, to enforce a
constructive trust or equitable lien on other property acquired with trust funds, so long as
the other property is held by the trustee and can be traced. Finally, Bogert indicates that
Oatway has been followed in some jurisdictions, but not in others, and is critical of those
courts that follow Oatway without regard to strict tracing rules or technical reasoning.
Bogert states,
"[t]he results in the Oatway case and the authorities following it seem based
on a strong preference for the trust claimant as against a trustee who has
been guilty of an intentional breach of trust. As between these two
disputants it is natural that the courts should favor the beneficiary without
regard to strict tracing rules or technical reasoning. But they ignore the fact
that the real parties in interest who are contesting with the beneficiary are
the creditors of the defaulting trustee who had advanced value and have a
claim against all his assets which are not earmarked as security for other
claims. The creditors' position would seem fully as strong from an ethical
and equitable point of view as that of the beneficiary of the trust who is
usually a donee.
Bogert, §928 at pp. 491-92.
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had a typical banking relationship with the Great Basin Entities in which it provided
requested banking services to assist Great Basin with its cash management system.
Between December 27 and December 29, 2000, Wells Fargo representatives received
daily overdraft management reports which indicated that if all of the checks that had been
presented against the Concentration Account were processed and honored, then the
Concentration Account would be overdrawn. In each instance, in accordance with Wells
Fargo policy, a Wells Fargo representative contacted Great Basin's authorized
representative who responded that Great Basin would make the requisite wire transfers
into the Concentration Account to cover any overdrafts, which Great Basin in fact did.
Wells Fargo had absolutely no knowledge that the Great Basin Entities were in default of
their obligations to Volvo. As such, Wells Fargo appropriately permitted the checks to be
processed in the normal course.16 Based on these undisputed facts, there is no basis to
alter LIBR's rules as to Wells Fargo.
Second, in this particular case Volvo is not entitled to any special relief from the
LIBR rules because Volvo knew in the fall of 2000 that Great Basin was delinquent in its
payments to Volvo. Indeed, Volvo believed that Great Basin was deliberately
Volvo attempts to attribute some responsibility to Wells Fargo because it knew that
Volvo provided inventory financing to the Great Basin Entities. However, Volvo's
argument falls far short. Such knowledge does not in and of itself form a basis to impose
liability on Wells Fargo. See Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897
F.2d 611, 612 (1 st Cir. 1990). Large truck dealers such as Great Basin almost always
obtain inventory financing so such knowledge by itself, would not have been alarming to
Wells Fargo or constituted a basis for further inquiry. Also, it is not unusual for sellers of
financed inventory to use a portion of the proceeds from those sales to run its business
operations. As such, even if Wells Fargo had known that Great Basin was using some of
the proceeds from the sales of trucks secured by Volvo to pay its business expenses in
December of 2000, this knowledge would not have raised any "red flag" to Wells Fargo.
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withholding payments from Volvo on sold vehicles. R. 1029-36. Notwithstanding this
information, Volvo failed to take any of the following actions available to it: (1) ask
Great Basin to segregate the funds from the sale of its collateral from the other funds that
were being generated by the various Great Basin Entities; (2) suspend Great Basin's lines
of credit under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements; (3) take possession of the financed
vehicles that constituted its collateral, which vehicles it left at Great Basin; (4) require
direct payment from the parties who were purchasing the financed vehicles from Great
Basin (instead Volvo continued to allow those proceeds to be deposited into the
Concentration Account until late December 2000); and (5) notify Wells Fargo that Great
Basin was in default of its obligations under the Volvo Floor Plan Agreements. In fact,
Volvo did not provide notice of any kind to Wells Fargo that there were concerns or
17

problems relating the funds in the Concentration Account.

Since Volvo was better

positioned to protect its security interest than Wells Fargo, the LIBR rules should not be
altered to benefit Volvo.
Third, it would be especially unfair in this case to alter the LIBR rules to benefit
Volvo over Wells Fargo because the proceeds in question were dissipated by Great Basin
to cover business expenses. In fact, nearly $500,000 of the transferred monies went to
Volvo Trucks. It would be patently unfair to impose liability on Wells Fargo which
17

The reason Volvo may have failed to act was that a pending sale was being negotiated
of substantially all of Great Basin's Volvo-related dealership assets to its sister company,
Volvo Trucks. A major condition of the sale was that the Great Basin truck dealerships
needed to be ongoing business concerns. R. 1031, 1045, 1166-84. However, to
accomplish that condition Great Basin needed to use the proceeds from the sales of the
Volvo trucks to keep its business operations going.
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retains no funds, while allowing Volvo to obtain damages for monies that ended up in the
hands of its sister company, Volvo Trucks.
Finally, Mr. Judd candidly stated in his deposition that another rationale for his
approach in applying LIBR was to apply it in a way that most protected Volvo. R. 1141.
That rationale is contrary to the purpose of LIBR, which is designed to protect fairly and
neutrally the rights of all creditors. For instance, if under LIBR the proceeds are not
traceable into the commingled Concentration Account, then Volvo would become an
unsecured creditor of the Great Basin Entities to the extent of its loss, and it must be
treated on an equal basis with other unsecured creditors of the Great Basin Entities. See
J.D. Services, Inc., 284 B.R. at 298 (since the Bank could not trace the funds, the Bank
became a creditor to the extent of its loss and had to be treated on an equal basis with
other similarly situated creditors). LIBR cannot be manipulated in the manner advocated
by Volvo and Mr. Judd to protect Volvo, because that would be unfair to other creditors
and innocent third parties like Wells Fargo.
4.

Volvo's Theory Has No Relevance In This Case Because The
Funds Were In Fact Dissipated.

Finally, even if this Court were to adopt the exception to LIBR advocated by
Volvo, the exception has no application in this case because the funds at issue - the
$900,000 wire transferred into the Concentration Account by Great Basin on
December 29, 2000 - were in fact "dissipated" by Great Basin. Specifically, the funds
were dissipated because they were used to cover the checks drawn by Great Basin to pay

its regular business expenses. As such, the exception to LIBR suggested by Volvo is
factually inapplicable in this case.18
C.

Insley Has No Application To This Case.

Volvo argues that the holding in Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986), means that Volvo's "interest takes precedence over any interest
Wells Fargo could possibly claim." Applt's Brief at 18. Volvo is simply wrong because
in Insley, unlike this case, the proceeds were traceable and Draper Bank exercised a setoff. In Insley, the debtor had a bank account at Draper Bank. Id. at 1342. Sometime
prior to October 5, 1979, five checks totaling $91,621.25 were drawn against the bank
account and were presented to Draper Bank for payment. Draper Bank determined that
the account contained insufficient funds to cover the checks but decided, without
consulting the debtor, to pay them in overdraft. On October 5, 1979, Draper Bank
prepared a debit memo to the debtor informing it that it intended to cover the checks and
would be charging a $15 service charge, along with 18% interest for the debtor's use of
bank funds. The debtor's bank statement, shows that the transaction was posted on
October 9, 1979. Id. On the same date, the debtor completed the sale of a backhoe to a
third party and $237,918.30 in funds from that sale were deposited into the debtor's bank
account at Draper Bank. Id. Draper Bank, in turn, credited the debtor's account and then

18

Indeed, the three cases of Oatway, Brennan and City of Lincoln, upon which Volvo
relies, all involved scenarios in which the funds or property at issue were still in
existence. Volvo already has had the opportunity to make a claim to any remaining
proceeds from the sale of its collateral in Great Basin's bankruptcy case. Indeed, Volvo,
Zions Bank, Associates and others battled in Great Basin's bankruptcy case for many
months over how the remaining funds, i.e. non-dissipated funds, should be divided.
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paid itself by exercising a set-off for the money it had previously advanced to pay the
overdrafts. The creditor who claimed a security interest in the backhoe, brought an action
against Draper Bank for converting the proceeds from the sale of the backhoe. Id. at
1346-47. The Utah Supreme Court, ruling for the creditor, focused on Draper Bank's
argument, under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-104(i) that Article 9 does not apply "to any
right of setoff," and that therefore the UCC will have no application when there is a
priority dispute between a party that has a perfected security interest and a party that has
exercised a right of set-off. Id. at 1345. The supreme court rejected the argument that
under pre-Revised Article 9 the creditor's perfected security interest in cash proceeds of
inventory sold by the debtor had priority over Draper Bank's set-off rights. Id. at 1347.
Insley has no applicability here for several reasons. First, unlike the debtor in
Insley, Volvo cannot trace its proceeds into the Concentration Account on December 29,
2000. Second, unlike Draper Bank in Insley, Wells Fargo did not exercise a set-off in
this case. Here, Great Basin took the affirmative and voluntary step of wiring money
from its First Security Account into the Concentration Account for the express purpose of
covering the checks for the business expenses it had written.
This distinction between a voluntary payment and a set-off has been recognized in
Textron Financial Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wisconsin, 579 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
The debtor in Textron, Nelson's Sports Center, operated a retail boat and accessory
business. Nelson's had loans with Firstar Bank that were secured by a blanket security
interest in all of Nelson's assets except those specifically pledged elsewhere. Nelson's
also had a security agreement with Textron Financial to finance boats, trailers, and other

marine products. After receiving final payment on a boat financed by Textron, Nelson's
deposited the full amount in its checking account with Firstar. Nelson's failed to
promptly pay Textron on the boat, thereby violating its security agreement. Three days
later, with Nelson's express permission, Firstar recovered funds from Nelson's checking
account to be applied to a delinquent loan. Firstar claimed it had no notice that the funds
were proceeds from inventory sold under Textron's security interest. Textron brought an
action against Firstar claiming wrongful conversion. One of the arguments Textron made
was that Firstar's collection really amounted to a set-off. However, the appellate court
rejected that argument, holding:
As established in Commercial Discount Corp., a bank's right to keep a setoff is defeated by any security interest in the same funds, whether or not the
bank had knowledge that its set-off violated a security interest. We do not
agree, however, that Nelson's loan payment was a set-off. As Firstar notes,
a set-off is the involuntary taking of funds from a debtor's account.
Because no facts are alleged that would tend to show the loan payment to
Firstar was involuntary, we reject this claim.
Id. at 592 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).19 Likewise, in Security State Bank v.
Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 965 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. Iowa 1997), the court applied LIBR

It is also clear from Utah case law that the $900,000 wire payment made by Great
Basin to Wells Fargo could not have constituted a set-off because the requirements of
"mutuality" and "separate transactions" are lacking. As stated in Mark VII Fin.
Consultants v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1990), a "setoff refers to an
unrelated transaction." See also Blacks Law Dictionary 1404 (8th ed. 2004) (Set-off
defined as a "defendant's counterdemand against the plaintiffs claim"). Accordingly, no
set-off could have occurred in this case because the obligations that purportedly gave rise
to the set-off arose from the same transaction. Based upon Great Basin's assurance of
payment, Wells Fargo processed Great Basin's checks and then Great Basin made the
promised wire transfer from the First Security Account to the Concentration Account to
cover those checks. It was all part of the same transaction, and thus could not have been
a set-off. The requirement of mutuality is also lacking in this case. See Mark VII, 792
^

and found that all of the proceeds from the sale of Security Bank's collateral were
dissipated when the funding account became overdrawn, and Firstar Bank's payment of
overdrafts did not change this result since the payments were made by transfers from the
debtor's line of credit on debtor's own instructions, rather than from Firstar's initiative.
Because Wells Fargo merely accepted a voluntary payment from Great Basin to
cover the overdrafts, Insley has no application to this case.
POINT 2
UTAH'S UCC PERMITTED
WELLS FARGO, AS AN INNOCENT TRANSFEREE,
TO RECEIVE FUNDS FROM THE CONCENTRATION ACCOUNT
FREE AND CLEAR OF VOLVO'S SECURITY INTEREST
Although the District Court was not required to address Wells Fargo's additional,
alternative grounds for dismissal, Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo are also barred by
either Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC, or Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto of pre-Revised Article 9.

P.2d at 132. This requirement "allows parties that owe mutual debts to state the accounts
between them, subtract one from the other and pay only the balance." See Blacks Law
Dictionary 1404 (8th ed. 2004). However, on December 29, 2000, which is the date
Volvo claims Wells Fargo exercised the set-off, there were no mutual debts that existed
between Wells Fargo and Great Basin. Although Volvo claims that Great Basin owed an
obligation to Wells Fargo to cover the overdraft, Wells Fargo owed no corresponding
obligation to Great Basin because there were no funds in the Concentration Account.
They had all been dissipated and it contained a negative balance. Furthermore, the
$900,000 wire transfer into the Concentration Account on December 29, 2000 could not
have created the corresponding obligation on the part of Wells Fargo because that
transfer represented the payment to Wells Fargo.
20
On appeal, this Court can affirm dismissal on alternative grounds that were properly
presented below. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("[a]n appellate
court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other grounds.").
id

A.

Revised Article 9 of Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9a-332 Bars Volvo's Claims
Against Wells Fargo.

Section 70A-9a-332 of Revised Article 9 of Utah's UCC, which was enacted by
the Utah Legislature in 2000, provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free
of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
Barkley Clark, a respected commentator on the UCC, explained the policy behind
Section 70A-9a-332 as follows:
Under Rev. UCC § 9-332(b), a transferee of funds from the deposit account
takes free for a security interest in proceeds unless the transferee is acting in
"collusion" with the debtor. Under this rule, non-collusive transferees of
funds from the debtor's deposit account are protected more than any other
class of transferees. Their knowledge of the prior security interest is
irrelevant in the absence of collusion. The policy behind this priority, as
stated by the drafters, is to respect the finality of payments in the banking
system. Protected transferees include junior secured parties. . . .
See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code., Rev.
Ed., Volume 1 at § 16.07[8] (emphasis added). Revised Section 70A-9a-332(b) recodifies pre-Revised Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto except
that it sets forth a narrower "bad actor/collusion" test as contrasted with the "ordinary
course of business" test set forth in Section 70A-9-306(2).
Volvo does not argue that if Section 332(b) applies, its claim fails. Volvo,
however, argues that Section 332(b) does not apply to this case because its effective date
was July 1, 2001 (see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-701(l)). Volvo is mistaken. The Utah
Legislature indicated that the provisions of Revised Article 9 could be considered in
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transactions or liens that fell within its scope even if they occurred prior to Revised
Article 9's effective date. Specifically, Revised Section 70A-9a-702(l) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was
entered into or created before this act takes effect.
Volvo argues that Revised Section 70A-9a-702(i)'s transition rule does not apply
to this case because another transition rule, Section 70A-9a-709(l), precludes the
application of Revised Article 9 where the relative priorities between the parties were
established prior to July 1, 2001:
This act [Revised Article 9] determines the priority of conflicting claims to
collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established
before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority.
However, Volvo is wrong because this case does not involve a priority dispute between
competing creditors because Wells Fargo does not claim a priority to the funds in
question.

91

Rather, because Wells Fargo is a transferee in the ordinary course and

without collusion under the UCC, it simply took free of any security interest claimed by
Volvo. In other words, there are not relative priorities at issue within the meaning of
Section 70A-9a-709(l).
Furthermore, although Volvo argues that Revised Article 9 cannot apply because
statutes do not operate retroactively, Applt's Brief at p. 38, that is not true if the statute
expressly provides for retroactive application. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1953) ("No
part of these statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). Because the

11

For that reason, Volvo's reliance on Interbusiness Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of
Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp. 2d 230 (M.D. Pa. 1994) is misplaced. Applt's Bnef at 37-38.
16

transition rules of Revised Article 9 do provide expressly that Revised Article 9's
provisions should be applied to transactions or liens that fall within its scope even if they
occurred prior to Revised Article 9's effective date, Volvo's retroactivity argument must
fail. Accordingly, Section 70A-9a-332 bars Volvo's claims against Wells Fargo.
B.

If The Court Determines that Pre-Revised Article 9 Applies in this
Case, Then Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) Bar
Volvo's Claims Against Wells Fargo.

Alternatively, if pre-Revised Article 9 applies, Volvo's claims are barred by preRevised Section 70A-9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) thereto. Section 70A-9-306(2)
states as follows:
(2) Except where this chapter or Chapter 2a, Leases, otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale,
exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor.
However, Official Comment 2(c) to this section identifies an exception to a secured
creditor's right to recover proceeds transferred to third parties in the ordinary course:
(c) Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking
account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may
have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and
transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent conveyances would no
doubt in appropriate cases support: recovery of proceeds by a secured party
from a transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the
debtor to defraud the secured party.
The application of Official Comment 2(c) to this fact situation is a matter of first
impression in Utah. If Official Comment 2(c) does apply, it disposes of Volvo's claims
because the transfer was clearly in the ordinaiy course. However, Volvo argues that
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Official Comment 2(c) should not apply in this case for a number of reasons. First,
Volvo argues that Official Comment 2(c) conflicts with the language of Section 9-306(2)
and that the latter controls. Second, Volvo suggests that the ordinary course defense of
Official Comment 2(c) appears to be barred by the holding in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales
King International 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000). Applt's Brief at 42. Third, Volvo
contends that an ordinary course defense is precluded by Insley. Id. at 40-41. Fourth,
Volvo argues that even if Utah law is deemed silent on the issue, the weight of out-ofstate authority precludes an "ordinary course" defense under Official Comment 2(c) in
this case. Id. at 43-44. Finally, Volvo argues that even if the ordinary course defense
does apply, Wells Fargo has failed to satisfy the requirements of that defense. Id.
As shown, all of these arguments fail, and thus the Court should affirm the
judgment of the district court.
1.

Official Comments Provide Persuasive Guidance to Courts.

Volvo first argues that the language of Official Comment 2(c) cannot trump the
plain language of Section 9-306(2). Applt's Brief at 40. However, the drafters of the
UCC also drafted the official comments thereto and they obviously did not regard
Official Comment 2(c) as inconsistent with the language of Section 9-306(2). Moreover,
the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held the official comments to the UCC provide
persuasive guidance to courts. See, Simplot 17 P.3d at 1.108.

2.

In Simplot, the Utah Supreme Court Specifically Left Open the
Question of Whether Official Comment 2(c) is Authoritative,

Volvo contends that J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King International 17 P.3d 1100
(Utah 2000), appears to bar the ordinary course defense in this case. Applt's Brief at 42.
However, Volvo ignores the Simplot court's language directly relating to Official
Comment 2(c) that the issue is open in Utah:
The official comments to the UCC have not been adopted by the Utah
legislature and are therefore not authoritative, but rather, persuasive as to
the code's interpretation. Nor is it the case that this court has previously
recognized Comment 2(c) as an exception to the Code's general priority
rules. However, we find it unnecessary to address the authority of
Comment 2(c) at this time because it is not applicable to the instant case.
Id at 1108.
In Simplot, Bountiful Valley Produce ("BVP") produced onion and squash crops.
Simplot sold chemicals and fertilizer on credit to BVP and to secure its interests Simplot
maintained annual security agreements with BVP. BVP entered into a marketing
agreement with Sales King. As BVP's agent, Sales King sold BVP's crops but never
took ownership of them. Pursuant to their agreement, Sales King collected the proceeds
from the crop sales and then retained amounts from those proceeds to cover its sales
commissions and various expenses. Simplot was not paid for the chemicals and fertilizer
that it provided to BVP in 1995 and 1996, and it brought suit against Sales King for
conversion of the crop proceeds. As a defense, Sales King argued that it should be
allowed to retain the proceeds from the crop sales because they were paid to it in the
ordinary course of BVP's business under Section 9-306 and Official Comment 2(c). The
Utah Supreme Court found it was unnecessary to address the authority of Official
7Q

Comment 2(c) because it only applies if the "cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's
checking account" and since B VP never had access or control over the cash proceeds,
Official Comment 2(c) was not applicable in the case. Id. at 1108-09.
Accordingly, Simplot is distinguishable because the debtor, BVP, never obtained
control of the money, never deposited the funds into its checking account and thus never
made any payments to Simplot out of its checking account. Further, in leaving open the
authority of Official Comment 2(c), Simplot actually suggests that § 9-306(2) and
Official Comment 2(c) may be applicable where a party receives a voluntary payment
from a debtor in the ordinary course which is exactly what happened in this case.
3.

Insley Does Not Preclude Application of Official Comment 2(c),

Volvo argues that the supreme court's holding in Insley also precludes application
of the ordinary course defense under Official Comment 2(c). Applt's Brief at 40.
However, Insley was decided 14 years before Simplot, and the supreme court's indication
in Simplot that the authority of Official Comment 2(c) is an open question is the latest
pronouncement. Obviously, the supreme court did not read Insley to the contrary.
Moreover, as discussed above, the Insley case is factually distinguishable both
because Volvo's truck sales proceeds cannot be traced into the December 29, 2000 wire
transfer and because the transfer was expressly made by Great Basin to cover the specific
checks in process and was not a set-off.
Volvo also contends based on Insley that its perfected security interest in the
proceeds from the sale of its collateral trumps every defense and argument of Wells
Fargo. Applt's Brief at 41. However, Volvo's analysis of the effect of the perfection of a
in

security interest under the UCC is flawed. While it is true that once a party obtains a
perfected security interest it need only file UCC continuation statements to maintain that
perfection, it is not true that the secured party is never at risk of losing its collateral. The
UCC, both under Revised Article 9 and pre-Revised Article 9, recognizes a myriad of
situations in which a secured creditor can lose its collateral despite having a perfected
security interest. For example, under pre-Revised Article 9, a secured party may lose its
security interest if (a) its collateral proceeds cannot be traced and become unidentifiable
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(3); (b) its collateral proceeds are paid to an ordinary
course transferee under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2); (c) its collateral is purchased by
a buyer in the ordinary course under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-307; or (d) the secured
party becomes aware of a debtor's name change and yet fails to file a new financing
statement under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-402(7). Likewise, under Revised Article 9, a
secured party may lose its security interest to a transferee of funds from a deposit account
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-332, and to a bank that sets off funds in a deposit
account under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-340, unless the secured party has entered into a
control agreement. A secured creditor's security interest may also be defeated by
common law defenses such as estoppel and waiver, See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103.
Moreover, Volvo's assertion that Wells Fargo should have undertaken a UCC-1
search of all the filings against the Great Basin Entities lacks merit. First, there is
absolutely no way that, in the space of a few hours, Wells Fargo could have undertaken a
search of the UCC-1 records relating to all of the Great Basin Entities, let alone
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determine what all the numerous filings may have meant in that short time.

Second, it

would be bad public policy for the courts to impose liability on a financial institution
simply because it covers an overdraft without having done a UCC-1 search. In fact, the
courts have already recognized that because of the need for finality in banking
transactions there are good commercial reasons for not imposing, even on sophisticated
lenders, the responsibility of contacting inventory financiers to secure permission to take
payment from a dealer's ordinary bank account. See Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank
of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 612 (1 st Cir. 1990). That policy is reflected inbothpreRevised and Revised Article 9.
Finally, Volvo's suggestion that Wells Fargo should have just returned the checks
prior to the midnight deadline is without merit. It makes no sense for a bank, which has a
good business relationship with its customer and which is not aware that its customer has
any financial problems, to return checks that its customer has promised to cover, and in
fact, did cover. Indeed, if financial institutions were to adopt a policy of always returning
checks in order to protect themselves from such liability, it would have a detrimental
effect on our economy which relies to a large extent on the free flow of goods and credit.
4.

The Weight of the Out-of-State Authority Supports the
Application of 9-306(2) and Official Comment (2).

Volvo further argues that if the authority of Official Comment 2(c) is an open
question in Utah, this Court should not allow the ordinary course defense because the
22

Even if Wells Fargo knew of Volvo's security interest, that knowledge would not have
alerted Wells Fargo to any problems because Great Basin was permitted under the Volvo
Floor Plan Agreements to sell Volvo trucks in the ordinary course of its business and to
use the profits associated with those sales in its own business operations. R. 865, 923.

weight of out-of-state authority rejects such a defense. Applt's Brief at 43-44. However,
cases with fact situations similar to those here do recognize the application of the
ordinary course defense. For instance, in Textron supra, a debtor sold collateral in which
a secured party claimed a security interest and deposited the cash proceeds of the sale
into a deposit account. Subsequently, with the consent of the debtor, the depository bank
applied the funds in the account to an amount the debtor owed the depository bank. The
court applied Official Comment 2(c) and stated that the depository bank would be
permitted to retain the proceeds as an ordinary course transferee of money if it had
received the money in connection with the operation of the debtor's business and without
knowing or being reckless in knowing that the payment violated the secured party's
security interest. Textron, 579 N.W.2d. at 52. The Court also rejected the secured
party's argument that the application of the funds in the deposit account to the debtor's
obligation constituted a set-off. Id. Instead, the Court stated that "a set-off is the
involuntary taking of funds from a debtor's account," and there was no evidence that the
payment to the depository bank was involuntary. Id.
Similarly, in J.I Case Credit Corp. v. First National Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir.
1993), the Seventh Circuit held that a bank with a second lien interest took proceeds from
the sale of collateral free of the first lienor's security interest under Official Comment
2(c) because the payments made from the bank account were in the ordinary course, and
the bank with the second lien did not know and was not reckless in knowing whether the
payments violated the first lienor's security interest. The Seventh Circuit reached this
conclusion even though the bank holding the second lien interest knew about the
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existence of the first lien because there was no evidence that the bank suspected that the
debtor was violating the terms of the first lienor's security interest. The Seventh Circuit
also held that a negligence standard was not appropriate to apply to the bank's actions. L
I. Case Credit 991 F.2d at 1278.23
Moreover, the Utah Legislature's enactment of Revised Article 9 Section 70A-9a332, supports the application of Textron, and J.I. Case Credit in this case. As noted in
HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust 712 N.E.2d 952 (Ind. 1999), the most
recent revisions to Article 9 are simply codification of the broad and liberal interpretation
of the application of § 9-306(c) and Official Comment 2(c):
We note that in their most recent revision of Article 9, the American Law
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have proposed that this liberal approach [to apply the ordinary course
defense broadly] be codified. A new section would be added to Article 9
providing that 'transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds
free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.'
[Citation omitted]. Broad protection for transferees helps to ensure that
security interests in deposit accounts do not impair the free flow of funds..
. . Rules concerning recovery of payments traditionally have placed a high
value on finality. The opportunity to upset a completed transaction, or even

l

" See also ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Bank of the West 166 F.3d 295, 308 (5tn
Cir. 1999) (". . ., for purposes of Comment 2(c), a payment is within the "ordinary
course" if made in the operation of the debtor's business and if the recipient of the
payment acted in good faith and without knowledge of or recklessness about whether the
payment violated a third party's security interest."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State of
New York, 641 N.Y.S.2d 742, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), a car dealer sold a number of
vehicles, deposited the cash proceeds into its checking account, and paid the State of New
York over $400,000 to satisfy an existing sales tax liability. The court held that the
payments were made in the ordinary course of business applying Comment 2(c), so that
the State of New York primed a competing secured creditor which had claimed the funds
as proceeds of its perfected security interest in the car inventory. Id. at 203, 204.

to place a completed transaction in jeopardy by bringing suit against the
transferee of funds, should be severely limited.
Id. at 956 n.6.
Volvo cites three cases as support for its position: Bank of Brewton v. GMAC,
811 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ala. 1992); C & H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449
N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989), and GMAC v. Lincoln Nat 3 1 18 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2000).
While these cases decline to apply the ordinary course defense set forth in § 9-306 and
Official Comment 2 thereto, they do not do so because the ordinary course defense is not
a valid defense, but because those cases involved a set-off or wrongdoing by the party
asserting the ordinary course defense.
For instance, in GMAC, a creditor corporation that had provided floor plan
financing to an automobile dealer sued the dealer's bank to recover proceeds from the
sales of vehicles in which the creditor claimed a security interest on the basis that the
dealer bank had converted those proceeds by applying them to the dealer's account
overdrafts. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the creditor's security
interest in the proceeds from the sale took priority over the dealer bank's set-off rights,
and thus, the dealer bank was liable to the creditor for conversion. GMAC, 18 S.W.3d at
339-40. However, in this case, Wells Fargo did not exercise an involuntary set-off of any
of Volvo's collateral proceeds that were deposited into the Concentration Account.
Furthermore, although the court in GMAC did discuss the protection afforded by
§ 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2 thereto, it declined to apply that protection because
of improper behavior on the part of the bank. Contrary to bank policy, the overdrafts in

GMAC were reviewed and approved by the chairman of the bank, who also was the
founder of the entity whose account was overdrawn. Id. at 338. Moreover, there had
been an ongoing problem with overdrafts and the account had been overdrawn for 38 of
62 business days during the relevant three month time period. Id. Given these facts, the
court in GMAC did not grant ordinary course protection to the bank. However, no such
inappropriate behavior is alleged against Wells Fargo in this case.
In Brewton, the court ruled in favor of the secured party and against the bank
because the bank was on specific notice that the debtor was in default of its obligations to
its secured creditor GMAC because the bank had previously dishonored a total of
$130,000 in checks that the debtor had made out to GMAC. Brewton, 811 F.Supp. at
650. Notwithstanding this notice, the bank still accepted proceeds from the debtor that
were subject to GMAC's security interest. Id. at 651 Accordingly, the court found that
the protections afforded by § 9-306 would not be extended to the bank Id. at 651. Here,
Wells Fargo had no notice that Great Basin was in default of its obligations to Volvo.
The C & H Farm case involved a situation in which a bank routinely covered
checks in a debtor account that was often overdrawn during a four year period. The bank
also was on notice that sometimes the proceeds being deposited into the account were
identifiable proceeds of another parties' collateral. See C_&_H, 449 N.W.2d at 875.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the bank set-off collateral proceeds that had been
deposited into the debtor account to pay itself for the funds it advanced to cover the
overdrafts. Id. at 876. The secured creditor sued the bank and the bank argued that its
actions should be protected by the ordinary course defense. The court in C & H found

§ 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2 to be instructive, but declined to extend its
protections to the bank because it had exercised a set-off. IcL at 876-77. The situation is
different here because Wells Fargo did not go in and seize (or set-off) any of the funds in
the Concentration Account. Instead, Great Basin voluntarily made a payment to Wells
Fargo to cover the overdrafts that existed in the Concentration Account.
Moreover, Volvo's arguments are contrary to sound public policy which favors the
free flow of credit and recognizes the need for finality in banking transactions. In Harley
Davidson supra, the First Circuit explained the policy as follows:
. . . First the courts, using comment 2(c) to U.C.C. § 9-306 to determine
when they should trace proceeds through a commingled account, have
limited recovery to circumstances where the behavior of the third party, if
not fraudulent, has at least seemed highly unfair or improper. . . . If,
however, courts too readily impose liability upon those who receive funds
from the debtor's ordinary bank account—if, for example, they define
"ordinary course" of business too narrowly—then ordinary suppliers,
sellers of gas, electricity, tables, chairs, etc. might find themselves called
upon to return ordinary payments (from a commingled account) to a
debtor's secured creditor, say a financer of inventory. Indeed, we can
imagine good commercial reasons for not imposing, even upon
sophisticated suppliers or secondary lenders, who are aware that inventory
financers often take senior secured interests in "all inventory plus
proceeds," the complicated burden of contacting these financers to secure
permission to take payment from a dealer's ordinary commingled bank
account. [Citations omitted]. These considerations indicate that "ordinary
course" has a fairly broad meaning; and that a court should restrict the use
of tracing rules to conduct that, in the commercial context, is rather clearly
improper.
Harley Davidson, 897 F.2d at 622 (emphasis added).
Volvo also asserts that to permit Wells Fargo to pursue an "ordinary course"
defense would be unfair because it would allow Wells Fargo to "claim special rights
because of its own failure to investigate Great Basin's condition." Applt's Brief at 44.
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This argument ignores the very purpose behind Section 9-306(2) and Official Comment
2(c), which permits transferees of who receive payments in the ordinary course to "take
free of any claim" of a secured party without doing a UCC search in order to enhance
finality in business transactions and the free flow of credit.
5.

The Undisputed Facts of This Case Establish the Applicability of
9-306(2) and Official Comment (2)(c).

Finally, Volvo argues that Wells Fargo has not established "as a matter of law that
the ordinary course defense applies on the undisputed facts."24 Applt's Brief at 44.
Volvo does not specify which facts relating to that analysis are in dispute, only that
"addressing the issue would require the Court to review the record in detail - when the
trial court has not yet done so on this issue.55 Applt's Brief at 44-45. However, the
absence of any allegations by Volvo that the transfer was not in the ordinary course or
that Wells Fargo knew that the transfer violated Volvo's security interest undermines
Volvo's assertion. Indeed, as set forth in Rule 56(e), "[w]hen a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response by affidavit or
otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

-Volvo cites HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust, 712 N.E.2d 952 (Ind.
1999), for the proposition that the application of the ordinary course defense creates a
question of fact. However, HCC Credit Corp. actually states that the determination of
whether the ordinary course defense is applicable is a "question of law," although
"sometimes an evaluation of the extent to which payment was routine or the extent of the
recipient's knowledge will require factual analysis." Id. at 958. While the facts of a case
must always be applied to the law, if the facts are undisputed, it is appropriate for the
court to rule as a matter of law that the ordinary course defense applies. Id. at 958-59.
ZL£

The undisputed facts here do establish that the ordinary course defense protects
Wells Fargo. Whether a transferee of money will be protected by the ordinary course
defense under § 9-306(2) and Official Comment 2(c) generally depends on the
consideration of two factors: (a) was the money received in connection with the
operation of the debtor's business; and (b) did the transferee receive the money without
knowing or being reckless in knowing that the payment violated the secured party's
interest See Textron, 579 N.W.2d at 51; J. I. Case Credit 991 F.2d at 1279. The court
in Harley-Davidson explained that the ordinary course defense "should have a fairly
broad meaning" and that courts should "restrict the use of tracing rules to conduct that, in
the commercial context, is rather clearly improper." 897 F.2d at 622.
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the $900,000 wire transfer was paid to
Wells Fargo in connection with the operation of Great Basin's business. It is undisputed
that the Great Basin Entities had a cash management system at Wells Fargo where each
of the Great Basin Entities had its own Treasury Management Account and there was also
a Controlled Disbursement Account. The checks to pay Great Basin's business expenses
were drawn on one of these accounts, and the requisite funds to cover those checks were
transferred into those accounts from the Concentration Account. R. 995-97, 1018-19,
1283. On December 27 and 28, 2000, there were numerous checks that were drawn
against the Treasury Management Accounts and the Controlled Disbursement Account
that were to be paid with funds from the Concentration Account. R. 1218, 1229-30.
There is also no dispute that the list of the payees on the checks shows that they were for
Great Basin's business operations, and indeed the vast majonty of the amounts paid went
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to Volvo Trucks, Associates (Great Basin's other flooring lender) and to make tax
payments. R. 1229-30. There also was nothing unusual about the total amount of the
checks that had been presented for payment on December 27th and 28 l . Indeed, a review
of the electronic debits/bank debits in December 2000 bank statement for the
Concentration Account show that almost on a daily basis hundreds of thousands of
dollars were being transferred from the Concentration Account to the Treasury
Management Accounts or the Controlled Disbursement Account to cover payments from
those account. R. 608-15. Moreover, it would not be out of the ordinary for Wells Fargo
to permit the checks to be honored when Great Basin specifically promised that funds
would be transferred into the Concentration Account to cover the overdraft.
With respect to the second factor, there is no allegation and absolutely no evidence
that Wells Fargo knew or suspected that the $900,000 wire transfer it received was in
violation of Volvo's claimed security interest. In fact, Dean Luikart, who monitored the
Great Basin account for Wells Fargo, specifically testified that he was not aware of any
claim by any third party in the funds that Great Basin used to cover the overdrafts. R.
1004-05.25

Although Volvo makes no factual argument on appeal, Volvo did argue before the
district court that Wells Fargo "must have known" that is was acting to Volvo's prejudice
because it was aware of Volvo's security interest and knew that the funds that were
transferred into the Concentration Account were likely to be proceeds from the sale of
Great Basin's truck inventory. However, as explained in J.I. Case Credit knowledge of a
security interest does not mean that the party also has knowledge that the party is
receiving a payment in violation of that security interest. 991 F.2d at 1278. Nor is such
knowledge sufficient to establish recklessness on the part of the party receiving the
payment.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment entered by the
district court in favor of Wells Fargo.
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